• Title of article

    Balanced allocation mechanism: An optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions

  • Author/Authors

    Mohammadreza Razzazi، نويسنده , , Ali Esmaeeli-Nadimi، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2014
  • Pages
    25
  • From page
    190
  • To page
    214
  • Abstract
    This paper presents an optimal mechanism for allocating slots of multiple keywords to bidders who have only one budget limit for all their desired keywords; it is called the balanced allocation mechanism. In a balanced allocation, all the bidders and slots for the keywords are partitioned into consecutive and distinct structures called balanced blocks. The study develops efficient algorithms for this mechanism. For instance, an algorithm is developed to create a “perfect schedule” for each independent, balanced block. Using this scheduling, all the slots and budgets of all bidders will be consumed. The balanced allocation mechanism creates a balanced allocation with perfect scheduling for each balanced block. This research confirms that this is an optimal truthful mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a search engine.
  • Keywords
    Mechanism design , Optimal mechanism , Sponsored search auction , Truthfulness , Algorithmic game theory
  • Journal title
    Information Sciences
  • Serial Year
    2014
  • Journal title
    Information Sciences
  • Record number

    1216047