Title of article :
The emissions trading paradox
Author/Authors :
Florian Jaehn، نويسنده , , Peter Letmathe، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages :
7
From page :
248
To page :
254
Abstract :
This article considers the price history of CO2 allowances in the EU Emission Trading Scheme. Since European Emissions Trading started in 2005, the prices of allowances have varied between less than one and thirty Euro per ton of CO2. This previously unpredicted volatility and, more notably, a significant price crash in May 2005 led to the hypothesis that electricity producers might use their market power to influence the prices of allowances. Besides market power, the combination of information asymmetry and price interdependencies (between prices of primary goods – especially electricity – and allowances) plays an important role in explaining the emissions trading paradox. The model presented will show that banking can lead to such a price crash if market participators act rationally. Furthermore, in such a scenario banking can be profitable for sellers at the cost of buyers.
Keywords :
Banking , Emissions trading , Energy , Cooperative game theory , Decision analysis
Journal title :
European Journal of Operational Research
Serial Year :
2010
Journal title :
European Journal of Operational Research
Record number :
1312452
Link To Document :
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