مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - We study the evolutionary stability of purified equilibria of two-player normal form games, providing simple sufficient conditions for stability and for instability under the Bayesian best response dynamic.

Title of article :

We study the evolutionary stability of purified equilibria of two-player normal form games, providing simple sufficient conditions for stability and for instability under the Bayesian best response dynamic.

Author/Authors :

Kiyohiko G. Nishimura، نويسنده , , Hiroyuki Ozaki، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

دوماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2007

Pages :

From page :

668

To page :

694

Keywords :

Irreversible investment , optimal stopping , Knightian uncertainty , risk

Journal title :

Journal of Economic Theory

Serial Year :

2007

Journal title :

Journal of Economic Theory

Record number :

147705

Link To Document :

https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=10&DC=147705