مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment

Title of article :

Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment

Author/Authors :

Pierre-André Chiappori، نويسنده , , Franck Durand، نويسنده , , Pierre-Yves Geoffard، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1998

Pages :

From page :

499

To page :

511

Keywords :

Health insurance , Empiral contract theory , Demand for health care , Moral hazard , Natural experiment

Journal title :

European Economic Review

Serial Year :

1998

Journal title :

European Economic Review

Record number :

151152

Link To Document :