Patch leaving strategies and superparasitism: an asymmetric generalized war of attrition

When several competitors deplete a patch, it can be advantageous for each of them to stay provided that others leave, whereas, on the other hand, staying longer decreases the expected payoff for everyone. This situation can be considered as a generalized war of attrition. Previous studies have shown that optimal patch leaving strategies become stochastic and the expected leaving time is much larger than predicted by the marginal value theorem when competitors interfere. ssibility of superparasitism, as occurs for example in parasitoids, induces such interference. In addition, it gives several complications. First, the payoff of females that have left the patch is affected by the ovipositions of the remaining individuals. Second, differences in the arrival time of females cause payoff-relevant asymmetries, since females that arrived early on have parasitized more hosts in a patch at the moment superparasitism starts than those that arrived later. w that this can be modelled as an asymmetric generalized war of attrition, and derive global characteristics of the ESS for simultaneous decisions on when to start superparasitism and when to leave a patch.