• Title of article

    Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

  • Author/Authors

    Ferreira، نويسنده , , Flلvio and Bode، نويسنده , , Oana R.، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2013
  • Pages
    8
  • From page
    308
  • To page
    315
  • Abstract
    In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.
  • Keywords
    Industrial organization , optimization , Stackelberg model , R& , D investments , licensing , Game theory
  • Journal title
    Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation
  • Serial Year
    2013
  • Journal title
    Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation
  • Record number

    1537612