Title of article
Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
Author/Authors
Ferreira، نويسنده , , Flلvio and Bode، نويسنده , , Oana R.، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2013
Pages
8
From page
308
To page
315
Abstract
In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.
Keywords
Industrial organization , optimization , Stackelberg model , R& , D investments , licensing , Game theory
Journal title
Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation
Serial Year
2013
Journal title
Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation
Record number
1537612
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