One-third rules with equality: Second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations

The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics [Nowak et al. 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 246–650] describes a robustness criterion for evolution in a finite population: If at an A-frequency of 1 / 3 , the fitness of an A player is greater (smaller) than the fitness of a B player, then a single A mutant that appears in a population of otherwise all B has a fixation probability greater (smaller) than the neutral threshold 1 / N , the inverse population size. We examine the case where at an A-frequency of 1 / 3 , the fitness of an A player is exactly equal to the fitness of a B player. We find that in this case the relative magnitude of the cross payoffs matters: If the payoff of A against B is larger (smaller) than the payoff of B against A, then a single A mutant has a fixation probability larger (smaller) than 1 / N . If the cross payoffs coincide, we are in the special case of a partnership game, where the deviation cost from an inefficient equilibrium is exactly balanced by the potential gain of switching to the payoff dominant equilibrium. We show that in this case the fixation probability of A is lower than 1 / N . Finally, we illustrate our findings by a language game with differentiated costs of signals.