Answering Lord Perryʹs question: dissecting regulatory overfishing

In 1995, in response to the distressed condition of the British fishing industry, the House of Lords held a series of hearings on “Fish Stock Conservation and Management.” Lord Perry of Walton posed the straightforward question of why regulation was not succeeding: takes all the management systems into account—TACs [total allowable catches, or annual quotas], number of days at sea and the decommissioning programme—none of them has stopped the gross over-fishing that has taken place. There seem to be three factors to account for it: first, the scientific advice that is given; secondly, how far that advice is accepted by politicians who set the TACs and quotas; and, thirdly, whether the fishermen obey the regulations. Which of these are the most at fault at the moment? erryʹs question led us to ask to what degree publicly available information in the United States could shed light on the sources of overfishing in individual fisheries—what we will call “regulatory overfishing.” First, we set out a typology of the potential sources of regulatory overfishing. Next, we examine two case illustrations of federally managed, overfished fisheries in the United States. Each case generates important insights into the causes of regulatory overfishing and lessons for future management. In the final section of the paper, we make several suggestions aimed at improving fisheries management and the management process.