Deterrence theory and marine oil spills: Do coast guard civil penalties deter pollution?

This article tests the tenets of deterrence theory in the field of pollution control. Using data collected by the US Coast Guard and aggregated by 46 Captains of the Port/Marine Safety Officer regions, pooled time series regression is employed to test the effect of certainty, severity and swiftness of punishment on oil pollution control in the intracoastal waterways of the United States. The analysis provides support for the severity and swiftness aspects of deterrence theory, but there is ambiguity about the certainty hypothesis. sults suggest that a 10-day improvement in the speed with which penalties are assessed will reduce oil spillage by 0·6% and selected increases in the severity of punishment for oil spills can reduce spillage by 10%. To maximize the utility of these findings, regulatory organizations will need to ensure that accompanying penalty scales employ fine schedules that are constant rather than schedules that decrease the punitiveness of penalties for larger spills.