A vicious circle? The dynamics of rule-making in Norwegian fisheries

Fisheries management is typically “rich” in rules and regulations. Not only is there a constant supply of new rules as fishing practices change, resource crises occur and government ambitions rise, but there is also a frequent demand for rules from users who are affected by these changes. The standard response to these demands is more fine-tuned rules, improved enforcement and stricter sanctions. The outcome of this ‘dialectic’ is a management system that is hard to keep track of, difficult to oversee, and easy to beat. This is the vicious circle of fisheries management rule making, resulting in a plummeting of legitimacy and soaring costs of administration and enforcement. Is fisheries management, then, deemed to stay “rich” in rules—keeping, as it were, managers and users hostage to a process of continuous regulatory growth? Or are there ways of breaking this vicious circle of rules begetting rules? This paper describes the Norwegian experience with fisheries management rule production, the processes behind it and the attempts that have been launched to trim it down. As will be made clear, the system is conceived as extremely complex, both by fishermen who argue that they sometimes violate rules they never knew existed, and by bureaucrats and fishermenʹs representatives who would prefer a leaner, easy-to-administer, system.