The relation between external governance environment and over-investment: Evidence from industry regulation

Based on the Law and Finance theory, and the regulatory capture theory, external governance environment and industrial regulations can exert a certain influence on corporate over-investment. On the basis of qualitative analysis of the relationship between external governance environment and corporate over-investment under different industrial regulation conditions, this paper, using data of non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in the period 2001-2010, describes the regional distribution characteristics of over-investment of Chinese listed companies, and establishes an OLS regression model of the relationship between external governance environment and over-investment. The study respectively groups data from regulated and non-regulated industries as a sample and empirically tests the OLS regression model. Results show that: from the perspective of economic geography, there exists a local spatial cluster phenomenon in the distribution of over-investment of listed companies in regulated industries, while non-regulated industries conform to no regularity. In regulated industries, external governance environment factors (level of government intervention, rule of law and financial development) may exert a significant negative influence on the degree of over-investment of listed companies, but on non-regulated industries, their effect is reversed. Also, government intervention, legal enforcement and financial development are positively correlated to over-investment. Further research indicates that, compared with government intervention and financial development, legal enforcement influences over-investment the most.