Title of article
Central bank design with heterogeneous agents
Author/Authors
Berentsen، نويسنده , , Aleksander and Strub، نويسنده , , Carlo، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
Pages
14
From page
139
To page
152
Abstract
We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.
Keywords
Central bank design , Policy board , Majority voting , Monetary policy
Journal title
European Economic Review
Serial Year
2009
Journal title
European Economic Review
Record number
1798197
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