Title of article
Strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions: An empirical investigation
Author/Authors
Fragetta، نويسنده , , Matteo and Kirsanova، نويسنده , , Tatiana، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages
25
From page
855
To page
879
Abstract
This paper identifies leadership regimes in monetary-fiscal policy interactions in three countries, the UK, the US and Sweden. We specify a small-scale, structural general equilibrium model of an open economy and estimate it using Bayesian methods. We assume that the authorities can act strategically in a non-cooperative policy game, and compare different leadership regimes. We find that the model of fiscal leadership gives the best fit for the UK and Sweden, while in the US the Nash or non-strategic regime dominates. We assess the extent to which policy maker preferences reflect microfounded social preferences.
Keywords
Monetary and fiscal policy , Policy objectives , Macroeconomic stabilization , leadership , Bayesian estimation
Journal title
European Economic Review
Serial Year
2010
Journal title
European Economic Review
Record number
1798395
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