• Title of article

    Strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions: An empirical investigation

  • Author/Authors

    Fragetta، نويسنده , , Matteo and Kirsanova، نويسنده , , Tatiana، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
  • Pages
    25
  • From page
    855
  • To page
    879
  • Abstract
    This paper identifies leadership regimes in monetary-fiscal policy interactions in three countries, the UK, the US and Sweden. We specify a small-scale, structural general equilibrium model of an open economy and estimate it using Bayesian methods. We assume that the authorities can act strategically in a non-cooperative policy game, and compare different leadership regimes. We find that the model of fiscal leadership gives the best fit for the UK and Sweden, while in the US the Nash or non-strategic regime dominates. We assess the extent to which policy maker preferences reflect microfounded social preferences.
  • Keywords
    Monetary and fiscal policy , Policy objectives , Macroeconomic stabilization , leadership , Bayesian estimation
  • Journal title
    European Economic Review
  • Serial Year
    2010
  • Journal title
    European Economic Review
  • Record number

    1798395