Title of article
Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams
Author/Authors
Bose، نويسنده , , Arup and Pal، نويسنده , , Debashis and Sappington، نويسنده , , David E.M. Sappington، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages
15
From page
947
To page
961
Abstract
We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents’ individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents’ contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.
Keywords
Moral hazard , Asymmetric treatment , Teams
Journal title
European Economic Review
Serial Year
2010
Journal title
European Economic Review
Record number
1798403
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