• Title of article

    The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

  • Author/Authors

    Feltovich، نويسنده , , Nick and Swierzbinski، نويسنده , , Joe، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
  • Pages
    21
  • From page
    554
  • To page
    574
  • Abstract
    We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.
  • Keywords
    Strategic uncertainty , Unstructured bargaining , Nash bargaining , Outside option , Cheap Talk , Binding agreements , Coase Theorem
  • Journal title
    European Economic Review
  • Serial Year
    2011
  • Journal title
    European Economic Review
  • Record number

    1798492