• Title of article

    Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword

  • Author/Authors

    J. Schottmüller، نويسنده , , Christoph، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2013
  • Pages
    16
  • From page
    43
  • To page
    58
  • Abstract
    If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patientsʹ objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctorʹs examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.
  • Keywords
    Cheap Talk , Patient–doctor communication , Health insurance , Health market design
  • Journal title
    European Economic Review
  • Serial Year
    2013
  • Journal title
    European Economic Review
  • Record number

    1798914