Title of article
Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword
Author/Authors
J. Schottmüller، نويسنده , , Christoph، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2013
Pages
16
From page
43
To page
58
Abstract
If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patientsʹ objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctorʹs examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.
Keywords
Cheap Talk , Patient–doctor communication , Health insurance , Health market design
Journal title
European Economic Review
Serial Year
2013
Journal title
European Economic Review
Record number
1798914
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