Title of article
The influence of seller strategy on the winning price in online auctions: A moderated mediation model
Author/Authors
Reynolds، نويسنده , , Kristy E. and Gilkeson، نويسنده , , James H. and Niedrich، نويسنده , , Ronald W.، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
Pages
9
From page
22
To page
30
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of seller strategy on winning prices in online auctions. In our conceptual model, three strategic choices made by the seller – minimum opening price, auction length, and use of a hidden reserve price – are mediated by the number of bids placed during the auction and moderated by product type. Our tests analyze eBay auction data for four consumer products through two matched studies (two products per study). In particular, we compare products for which value is easily determined with those for which value is less clear. Overall, we find strong evidence of the effects of minimum opening price and hidden reserve prices on final winning prices. The impact of auction length on winning price is less clear. In general, our tests support the idea that potential buyers rely more on signals such as opening price and reserve price for products for which reference prices are less available.
Keywords
internet auctions , Auction pricing , online auctions , Pricing
Journal title
Journal of Business Research
Serial Year
2009
Journal title
Journal of Business Research
Record number
1954115
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