• Title of article

    Cash versus incentive compensation: Lawsuits and director pay

  • Author/Authors

    Crutchley، نويسنده , , Claire E. and Minnick، نويسنده , , Kristina، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2012
  • Pages
    7
  • From page
    907
  • To page
    913
  • Abstract
    The role of the board of directors is to oversee managerial decisions and to protect the interests of shareholders. While director pay historically is a small cash fee, many corporations now use both stock and option grants as a part of a directorʹs compensation. This paper examines whether this incentive pay aligns the interests of directors with those of the shareholders. We study the special case of shareholder lawsuits that specifically name the board of directors. These lawsuits indicate a breakdown in the trust and therefore the relationship between shareholders and directors. We find that when directors are paid with high incentive pay (designed to align their interests with shareholders) there is a greater incidence of lawsuits. Interestingly, greater cash compensation actually reduces the likelihood of a lawsuit.
  • Keywords
    Lawsuits , compensation , Corporate governance , OPTIONS
  • Journal title
    Journal of Business Research
  • Serial Year
    2012
  • Journal title
    Journal of Business Research
  • Record number

    1955062