Task instructions and implicit theory of mind

It has been hypothesized that humans are able to track other’s mental states efficiently and without being conscious of doing so using their implicit theory of mind (iToM) system. However, while iToM appears to operate unconsciously recent work suggests it does draw on executive attentional resources (Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012) bringing into question whether iToM is engaged efficiently. Here, we examined other aspects relating to automatic processing: The extent to which the operation of iToM is controllable and how it is influenced by behavioral intentions. This was implemented by assessing how task instructions affect eye-movement patterns in a Sally–Anne false-belief task. One group of subjects was given no task instructions (No Instructions), another overtly judged the location of a ball a protagonist interacted with (Ball Tracking) and a third indicated the location consistent with the actor’s belief about the ball’s location (Belief Tracking). Despite different task goals, all groups’ eye-movement patterns were consistent with belief analysis, and the No Instructions and Ball Tracking groups reported no explicit mentalizing when debriefed. These findings represent definitive evidence that humans implicitly track the belief states of others in an uncontrollable and unintentional manner.