Title of article
A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
Author/Authors
Albano، Gian Luigi نويسنده , , Germano، Fabrizio نويسنده , , Lovo، Stefano نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2001
Pages
-54
From page
55
To page
0
Abstract
In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey¯Clarke¯Groves auctions.
Keywords
Strategic market game , Buy and sell , Buy or Sell
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2001
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
21657
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