Title of article
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case
Author/Authors
Bester، Helmut نويسنده , , Strausz، Roland نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2000
Pages
-164
From page
165
To page
0
Abstract
This paper employs quarterly data from the whole of Germany to test the stability of M3 demand for money. The methodology is based on an application of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ in the context of error-correction modeling and cointegration. The results reveal some instability in M3 money demand function.
Keywords
Mechanism design , Limited commitment , Revelation principle , Asymmetric information
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2000
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
21910
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