• Title of article

    Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

  • Author/Authors

    Bargeron، نويسنده , , Leonce L. and Schlingemann، نويسنده , , Frederik P. and Stulz، نويسنده , , René M. and Zutter، نويسنده , , Chad J.، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
  • Pages
    16
  • From page
    375
  • To page
    390
  • Abstract
    Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.
  • Keywords
    Private equity acquisitions , Target abnormal returns
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Serial Year
    2008
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Record number

    2211621