Title of article
Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?
Author/Authors
Bargeron، نويسنده , , Leonce L. and Schlingemann، نويسنده , , Frederik P. and Stulz، نويسنده , , René M. and Zutter، نويسنده , , Chad J.، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Pages
16
From page
375
To page
390
Abstract
Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.
Keywords
Private equity acquisitions , Target abnormal returns
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year
2008
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number
2211621
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