Title of article :
Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?
Author/Authors :
Bargeron، نويسنده , , Leonce L. and Schlingemann، نويسنده , , Frederik P. and Stulz، نويسنده , , René M. and Zutter، نويسنده , , Chad J.، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Abstract :
Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.
Keywords :
Private equity acquisitions , Target abnormal returns
Journal title :
Journal of Financial Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Financial Economics