• Title of article

    Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

  • Author/Authors

    Aggarwal، نويسنده , , Reena and Erel، نويسنده , , Isil and Ferreira، نويسنده , , Miguel and Matos، نويسنده , , Pedro، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
  • Pages
    28
  • From page
    154
  • To page
    181
  • Abstract
    We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.
  • Keywords
    Corporate governance , institutional investors , Shareholder activism
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Serial Year
    2011
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Record number

    2212012