Title of article
Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors
Author/Authors
Aggarwal، نويسنده , , Reena and Erel، نويسنده , , Isil and Ferreira، نويسنده , , Miguel and Matos، نويسنده , , Pedro، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
Pages
28
From page
154
To page
181
Abstract
We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.
Keywords
Corporate governance , institutional investors , Shareholder activism
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year
2011
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number
2212012
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