Title of article
Friends with money
Author/Authors
Engelberg، نويسنده , , Joseph and Gao، نويسنده , , Pengjie and Parsons، نويسنده , , Christopher A.، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2012
Pages
20
From page
169
To page
188
Abstract
When banks and firms are connected through interpersonal linkages – such as their respective management having attended college or previously worked together – interest rates are markedly reduced, comparable with single shifts in credit ratings. These rate concessions do not appear to reflect sweetheart deals. Subsequent firm performance, such as future credit ratings or stock returns, improves following a connected deal, suggesting that social networks lead to either better information flow or better monitoring.
Keywords
Asymmetric information , Bank lending , Social connections , Cost of debt , Lending outcomes
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year
2012
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number
2212283
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