Title of article :
Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia
Author/Authors :
Martin، نويسنده , , Jean-Rémy and Dezecache، نويسنده , , Guillaume and Pressnitzer، نويسنده , , Daniel and Nuss، نويسنده , , Philippe and Dokic، نويسنده , , Jérôme and Bruno، نويسنده , , Nicolas and Pacherie، نويسنده , , Elisabeth and Franck، نويسنده , , Nicolas، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2014
Pages :
11
From page :
62
To page :
72
Abstract :
People with schizophrenia are known to exhibit difficulties in the updating of their current belief states even in the light of disconfirmatory evidence. In the present study we tested the hypothesis that people with schizophrenia could also manifest perceptual inflexibility, or difficulties in the updating of their current sensory states. The presence of perceptual inflexibility might contribute both to the patients’ altered perception of reality and the formation of some delusions as well as to their social cognition deficits. Here, we addressed this issue with a protocol of auditory hysteresis, a direct measure of sensory persistence, on a population of stabilized antipsychotic-treated schizophrenia patients and a sample of control subjects. Trials consisted of emotional signals (i.e., screams) and neutral signals (i.e., spectrally-rotated versions of the emotional stimuli) progressively emerging from white noise – Ascending Sequences – or progressively fading away in white noise – Descending Sequences. Results showed that patients presented significantly stronger hysteresis effects than control subjects, as evidenced by a higher rate of perceptual reports in Descending Sequences. The present study thus provides direct evidence of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia.
Keywords :
Schizophrenia , Predictive deficits , Perceptual inflexibility , Belief inflexibility , Perceptual hysteresis
Journal title :
Consciousness and Cognition
Serial Year :
2014
Journal title :
Consciousness and Cognition
Record number :
2292885
Link To Document :
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