A game-theoretic approach for the web services scheduling problem

We address the design of an Internet-based business process composed of several web services by using multiobjective optimization and game-theoretic methods. Adopting a suitable representation for the business process, we present a mathematical optimization problem which considers several quality-of-service objectives: cost, execution time, reliability, availability and reputation. The web service scheduling problem is formulated as a multiobjective mixed-integer linear optimization problem and solved through a goal optimization method. The optimal solution of the scheduling problem assigns suppliers to all the tasks that comprise the business process, thus establishing the revenues – utilities – of all the suppliers. We then model the interaction between the suppliers as an incomplete information (Bayesian) game: the structure of the game is common knowledge of all the suppliers, but each supplier knows only his/her own utility function. A characterization of the Bayes–Nash equilibria of the game is provided. The paper includes numerical examples.