Title of article
Optimisation of Healthcare Contracts: Tensions Between Standardisation and Innovation; Comment on “Competition in Healthcare: Good, Bad or Ugly?”
Author/Authors
Mikkers، Misja نويسنده NZa, Dutch Healthcare Authority, Utrecht, The Netherlands; Free University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands , , Ryan، Padhraig نويسنده Centre for Health Policy and Management, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی 0 سال 2016
Pages
3
From page
121
To page
123
Abstract
An important determinant of health system performance is contracting. Providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence performance. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer system. This innovation in contract design could enhance performance. However, contractual innovation often fails to improve performance as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries seek to improve healthcare contracts, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting.
Journal title
International Journal of Health Policy and Management(IJHPM)
Serial Year
2016
Journal title
International Journal of Health Policy and Management(IJHPM)
Record number
2359384
Link To Document