Title of article
An Interaction between Government and Manufacturer in Implementation of Cleaner Production:A Multi-Stage Game Theoretical Analysis
Author/Authors
Zhao، R. نويسنده Faculty of Geosciences and Environmental Engineering, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 611756, China , , PENG، D. نويسنده , , Li، Y. نويسنده ,
Issue Information
فصلنامه با شماره پیاپی 35 سال 2015
Pages
10
From page
1069
To page
1078
Abstract
This paper shows how game theory can be applied to modeling the interaction between
government and manufacturer in implementation of cleaner production. A generic game model based upon
‘Two-person Non-cooperative’ static game is created to allow various strategic actions being tested by stages,
and aid decision making by selecting optimal strategy for both manufacturer and policy maker to reduce
lifecycle based environmental impact while maximizing the economic benefits. The game theoretical result
suggests a ‘win-win’ strategic situation as the best interaction, which indicates that manufacturer implements
the clean technology voluntarily and government no longer needs to intervene intensely in manufacturer’s
environmental unfriendly behavior. In addition, a case example is given to help a tombarthite manufacturer
select the feasibly optional clean technology to improve the existing process of production, which provides a
useful insight into the application of game theory. Limitations of the game theoretical analysis are discussed to
lay out a foundation for further study.
Journal title
International Journal of Environmental Research(IJER)
Serial Year
2015
Journal title
International Journal of Environmental Research(IJER)
Record number
2385514
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