مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior

Title of article :

Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior

Author/Authors :

Henock Louis، نويسنده , , Hal White، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2007

Pages :

From page :

205

To page :

233

Keywords :

Financial reporting , signaling , Managerial opportunism , Repurchase tender offers

Journal title :

Journal of Financial Economics

Serial Year :

2007

Journal title :

Journal of Financial Economics

Record number :

257941

Link To Document :