Pricing in two competing supply chains based on market power and market size under centralized and decentralized structures

This study considered the competition between two multi-echelon supply chains with identical structures on price under two market power structures. For this purpose, two dierent scenarios were developed. In the rst scenario, both supply chains decided simultaneously (the Nash game). In the second scenario, due to the imbalance of power between the two supply chains, the Stackelberg game was adopted in the model. The paper investigated the eects of dierent relations between the market sizes of supply chains and the supply chain structures on price and prot along with the analysis of power in the market. Based on these assumptions, it was found that the supply chains did not always involve the second-mover advantage in the price Stackelberg game. Furthermore, having the centralized structure, both of the supply chains beneted from the presence of a leader in the market for dierent combinations of market size. Moreover, the relationship between price and prot was analyzed given the size of the market in dierent scenarios rather than through provision of numerical examples.