• Title of article

    corporate taxpayer compliance: slippery slope framework and planned behavior theory approaches

  • Author/Authors

    seran, yohanes febronius araujo institute of business (iob) - faculty of economics and business, indonesia , baridwan, zaki brawijaya university - faculty of economics and business, timor, indonesia , rosidi brawijaya university - faculty of economics and business, indonesia

  • From page
    334
  • To page
    347
  • Abstract
    the purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the influence of trust in tax authorities and the power of tax authorities as defined in the slippery slope framework to corporate taxpayer s intention to comply, then examine and analyze the effect of tax compliance intentions on corporate taxpayer compliance. this study took samples of companies included in category a corporate taxpayer in timor leste consisting of 53 respondents, using survey methods and primary data. the sampling technique uses the census method. the results of this study indicate that, first the trust in the tax authority and the power of the tax authority does not have a positive effect on the intention of tax compliance. second, the intention of tax compliance has a positive effect on the behavior of tax compliance, both voluntary compliance and enforced compliance. third, tax justice which consists of tax system fairness and procedural fairness, is not proven as a moderating variable that strengthens the relationship of trust to the tax authority and the power of the tax authority to the intention of tax compliance. this research is an additional empirical evidence that integrates aspects of social psychology and deterrence aspects in understanding tax compliance behavior in developing countries.
  • Keywords
    tax compliance , slippery slope , tax fairness , planned behavior theory
  • Journal title
    International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding
  • Journal title
    International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding
  • Record number

    2705300