The Limitations of the Lmplementation of Polycentric Governance in Iran’s Raw Steel Production Inputs (With an Emphasis on Iron Ore)

The aim of this study is to examine the tragedy of the commons in Iran’s iron ore mining sector. To do so, the theory of polycentric governance was employed, taking into account the lack of legal and distributional frameworks for common resources, and incorporating the theories of Commons and Nozick. The steel industry faces several challenges, such as pollution, raw material supply, lack of cooperation between miners and steel producers, lack of energy in raw steel production, and government intervention and sanctions, which all stem from the monocentric decision-making system. The current research begins by introducing various types of polycentric governance and then delves into the Ostrom-Commons-Nozick theory, utilizing content analysis and analytical descriptive methods. The analysis first examines the different types of polycentric governance, taking into consideration the distribution of power among institutions and the legal rules outlined by Commons. Polycentric governance is concerned with the negotiation process. The vulnerability index is used to assess the consequences of government intervention and monocentric governance. The study’s findings reveal a fragmented polycentric governance in operation in the national steel industry. Due to recent imposed sanctions and the multitude of government institutions, strong polycentric governance is not feasible in Iran, given the existing structural inequalities, such as the country’s degree of development and climatic conditions. A consistent choice could not be attained.