مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts

Title of article :

Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts

Author/Authors :

Choi، نويسنده , , Yoon K.; Merville، نويسنده , , Larry J. Merville، نويسنده , , Larry، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1995

Pages :

From page :

To page :

Abstract :

A principal-agent model is extended to examine the optimal incentive contract when the manager is motivated

Journal title :

Economics Letters

Serial Year :

1995

Journal title :

Economics Letters

Record number :

433827

Link To Document :