Title of article
Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives
Author/Authors
Basu، نويسنده , , Kaushik ، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1995
Pages
6
From page
459
To page
464
Abstract
This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly, if an ownerʹs decision to hire a manager is modeled explicitly, then the subgame perfect equilibrium may coincide with the Stackelberg solution. Interestingly, this can happen even when the cost of hiring a manager is the same for the owner of each firm.
Keywords
Managerial incentive: Stackelberg solution: Principal-agent , OLIGOPOLY
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
1995
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
434023
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