Title of article
A collective tournament
Author/Authors
Drago، نويسنده , , Robert; Garvey، نويسنده , , Gerald T.; Turnbull، نويسنده , , Geoffrey K. ، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1996
Pages
5
From page
223
To page
227
Abstract
Traditional tournaments among workers yield suboptimal levels of helping efforts, while collective incentives generate free-riding or lack incentive compatibility. We confront these problems using a tournament between workplaces. Under fairly restrictive conditions, the collective tournament is first best and incentive compatible.
Keywords
Work incentives , teamwork , Tournaments
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
1996
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
434055
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