Title of article
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
Author/Authors
Yeon-Koo، نويسنده , , Che; Gale، نويسنده , , Ian ، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1996
Pages
7
From page
373
To page
379
Abstract
We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.
Keywords
First-price sealed-bid auctions , Budget constraints , All-pay auctions
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
1996
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
434076
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