Title of article
Quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly
Author/Authors
Jean J. Gabszewicz، نويسنده , , Xavier Y. Wauthy، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2002
Pages
8
From page
65
To page
72
Abstract
In the Mussa and Rosen model [J Econ Theory 18 (1978) 301] of vertical differentiation, a monopolist may optimally choose to underprovide quality if consumers are allowed to buy several units of the indivisible good, even if quality provision involves no cost of any sort.
Keywords
Quality , Quantity , Vertical differentiation
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2002
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
435022
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