Title of article :
Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
Author/Authors :
Michael Margolis، نويسنده , , Jason F. Shogren، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2004
Pages :
7
From page :
141
To page :
147
Abstract :
The efficient auction is designed to induce truthful bidding for bidders with affiliated values. Herein we implement the auction in the lab, and observe inexperienced people can bid systematically in this more complex environment, albeit yielding a flatter bid function than the truthful one.
Keywords :
auction , Affiliation , Experiments , Valuation
Journal title :
Economics Letters
Serial Year :
2004
Journal title :
Economics Letters
Record number :
435461
Link To Document :
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