Title of article :
Learning to play second-price auctions, an experimental study
Author/Authors :
Jorge G. Aseff، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2004
Pages :
8
From page :
279
To page :
286
Abstract :
Existing experimental results in second-price auctions show that subjects bid consistently above their valuations. Experience, gained repeating a second-price auction, does not improve subjectʹs bidding behavior. When subjects ‘introspect,’ bidding behavior improves. Overbidding and underbidding fall significantly.
Keywords :
Second-price auctions , Overbidding , Underbidding
Journal title :
Economics Letters
Serial Year :
2004
Journal title :
Economics Letters
Record number :
435546
Link To Document :
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