Title of article
Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
Author/Authors
Rachel Croson، نويسنده , , Enrique Fatas، نويسنده , , Tibor Neugebauer، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
Pages
7
From page
95
To page
101
Abstract
Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others
Keywords
Experimental economics , Voluntary contribution mechanism , Public goods , Weakest link mechanism
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2005
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
435641
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