Title of article
When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
Author/Authors
Luis G. Gonz?lez، نويسنده , , Werner Güth، نويسنده , , M. Vittoria Levati، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
Pages
6
From page
221
To page
226
Abstract
In repeated public goods experiments, ruling out information about an exact, commonly known, and symmetric terminal period does not alter average contributions significantly, although asymmetric information about the time horizon reduces the frequency of end-game effects.
Keywords
End-game effect , Asymmetric information , Public goods experiment
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2005
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
435727
Link To Document