• Title of article

    Secession and value

  • Author/Authors

    Gerald Pech، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2006
  • Pages
    5
  • From page
    306
  • To page
    310
  • Abstract
    A model with random proposals, where secession of coalitions is the only threat, yields exploitative allocations. If proposals for coalition S involve randomization, the respondersʹ pay off vector consists of Shapley values for coalition sizes ranging from 1 to S − 1.
  • Keywords
    Bargaining , Shapley value
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2006
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    436010

    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=10&DC=436010