• Title of article

    Inefficient ownership and resale opportunities

  • Author/Authors

    Joshua S. Gans، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2006
  • Pages
    6
  • From page
    242
  • To page
    247
  • Abstract
    In a property rights model where there are opportunities to re-sell assets, ownership may reside with inefficient outsiders and efficient owners will have incentives to relinquish ownership to extract rents from others. Contractual restrictions on re-sale can prevent such inefficiencies.
  • Keywords
    Contractual restrictions , Outside parties , Incomplete contracts , Resale , Ownership
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2006
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    436073