• Title of article

    A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

  • Author/Authors

    K. Ola Andersson، نويسنده , , Erik Wengstr?m، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2007
  • Pages
    4
  • From page
    398
  • To page
    401
  • Abstract
    Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
  • Keywords
    Noncooperative game theory , Repeated bertrand games , Weak renegotiation-proofness
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2007
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    436243

    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=10&DC=436243