Abstract :
In 1948, in response to the perceived threat of atomic war, the British government
embarked on a new civil defence programme. By the mid-1950s, secret government reports
were already warning that this programme would be completely inadequate to deal with a
nuclear attack. The government responded to these warnings by cutting civil defence spending,
while issuing apparently absurd pamphlets advising the public on how they could protect
themselves from nuclear attack. Historians have thus far sought to explain this response
with reference to high-level decisions taken by policymakers, and have tended to dismiss civil
defence advice as mere propaganda. This paper challenges this interpretation by considering
the little-known role of the Home Office Scientific Advisers’ Branch, a group of experts whose
scientific and technical knowledge informed both civil defence policy and advice to the public.
It explores both their advisory and research work, demonstrating their role in shaping civil
defence policy and showing that detailed research programmes lay behind the much-mocked
government civil defence pamphlets of the 1950s and 1960s.
