Author/Authors :
Maleki، Mohammad Reza نويسنده , , MohammadzadehEbrahimi ، Farzad نويسنده ,
Abstract :
Abstract
Israel began its nuclear weapons program in 1958. Ever since the state of
Israel has pursued a consistent policy of nuclear ambiguity, and has amassed
over time a huge nuclear arsenal. The United States, as Israel’s strategic ally,
and despite some initial misgivings in the early 1960s, has actively supported
this policy of nuclear ambiguity. Faced with such a situation, other countries
in the region have tried, since 1963, to work towards the establishment of a
nuclear- and WMD-free Middle East, which has failed to materialize up to
now. The present article looks into the development of the nexus between
the Israeli nuclear ambiguity policy and regional efforts towards the
establishment of a nuclear- and WMD-free Middle East. The article will
discuss the rationale of the Israeli outlook and policy and their implications
and repercussions for the countries in the region, and the region at large.
The article argues that the Israeli nuclear policy and the categorical refusal to
join the NPT have as a matter of fact served as a source of national security
threat for others in the region, led some to seek to acquire nuclear
capability, and forced arms race on a regional scale. The article concludes
that issues of interest and concern to all the parties involved would, in the
final analysis, have to be addressed within the context of and in relation to
other issues, including in particular, the nexus between regional peace and
the nuclear issue. The authors’ final conclusion is that meaningful
movement in such a direction will require and depend on the emergence of
a realistic outlook on the part of all parties concerned.