Abstract :
Mobile agent technology is promising for e-commerce and distributed computing applications due to its
properties of mobility and autonomy. One of the most security-sensitive tasks a mobile agent is expected to
perform is signing digital signatures on a remote untrustworthy service host that is beyond the control of the
agent host. This service host may treat the mobile agents unfairly, i.e. according to its’ own benefit rather
than to their time of arrival. In this research, we present a novel protocol, called Collusion-Resistant Distributed
Agent-based Signature Delegation (CDASD) protocol, to allow an agent host to delegate its signing
power to an anonymous mobile agent in such a way that the mobile agent does not reveal any information
about its host’s identity and, at the same time, can be authenticated by the service host, hence, ensuring fairness
of service provision. The protocol introduces a verification server to verify the signature generated by
the mobile agent in such a way that even if colluding with the service host, both parties will not get more
information than what they already have. The protocol incorporates three methods: Agent Signature Key
Generation method, Agent Signature Generation method, Agent Signature Verification method. The most
notable feature of the protocol is that, in addition to allowing secure and anonymous signature delegation, it
enables tracking of malicious mobile agents when a service host is attacked. The security properties of the
proposed protocol are analyzed, and the protocol is compared with the most related work.
Keywords :
Agent-Based Signature Delegation , Anonymous Digital Signature , Collusion-Resistant Signature , Signature Fairness