On Philosophy’s (lack of) Progress: From Plato to Wittgenstein (and Rawls)

I argue that the type of progress exhibited by philosophy is not that exhibited by science (as analysed e.g. by Thomas Kuhn), but rather is akin to the kind of progress exhibited (say) be someone becoming ‘older and wiser’. However, as actuallyexisting philosophy has gotten older, it has not always gotten wiser. As an illustration, I consider Rawls’s conception of justification. I argue thatRawls’s notion of what it is to have a philosophical justification exhibits no progress at all from Euthyphro’s. In fact, drawing on a remark of Wittgenstein’s, I suggest that Rawls’s conception is inferior to the situation as depicted in Plato’s famous dialogue – because at least in the case of Plato’s Euthyphro, there is no illusion of justification.