Abstract :
Mark McCreary has argued that I cannot consistently advance both thehiddenness argument and certain arguments for religious scepticism found in mybook The Wisdom to Doubt (WD). This reaction was expected, and in WD I explainedits shortsightedness in that context. First, I noted how in Part III of WD, wheretheism is addressed, my principal aim is not to prove atheism but to show theiststhat they are not immune from the scepticism defended in Parts I and II. To thesuccess of this aim, McCreary’s arguments are not so much as relevant, for athoroughgoing scepticism embracing even the hiddenness argument is quitecompatible with its success. But I also explained how someone convinced that thehiddenness argument does prove atheism escapes the grip of religious scepticismbecause of that argument’s reliance on apparent conceptual truths. McCreary’scritique obscures this point but does not defuse it
