Sceptical theism and divine lies

In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I presenta line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism aboutdivine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popularsceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus,I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either(a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the scepticaltheistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil fails. Animplication of (a) is that sceptical theism is at odds with any religious traditionaccording to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely invirtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true. This result will renderconceding (a) unattractive to many sceptical theists